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Introduction:
This chapter is concerned with refugee repatriation and reintegration as part of the
implementation of a peace accord.2 I will use the term “refugee” loosely to apply to both
internally displaced persons (IDPs) as well as those who actually cross borders except, as
in cases of forced repatriation where it is necessary to distinguish between the treatment
accorded the internally displaced and the refugees.
Solving the problem not only of the refugees but of displaced persons is generally
considered to be a core element in finding a peaceful resolution of a violent conflict.
Large numbers of refugees and displaced persons are generally at least a byproduct if not
an actual intended product of the violence as in Bosnia and Kosovo. For example,
Elizabeth Cousens noted in her case study that by the time the Dayton Agreement was
initialed, “over half of Bosnia’s pre-war population of 4.4 million had fled their original
homes, either to live as refugees outside the country or as internally displaced persons
elsewhere in Bosnia.” (p. 8) The Sierra Leone 1990s war produced 400,000 refugees
(8.97% of the population) and one-third of the 4.6 million population was internally
displaced.
Contrast this with the much smaller number of refugees in absolute and relative
percentages produced by earlier conflicts such as the one in Namibia which resulted in
40,000 to 90,000 refugees. There has been a definite trend to increased numbers of
refugees as well as internally displaced persons culminating in the extreme of Kosovo
where virtually 85% of the population was either displaced or fled across adjacent
borders. The Angolan conflict is another situation in which the numbers of refugees and
internally displaced keep escalating from the original 425,000 refugees and 800,000
internally displaced recorded in 1991 to the over one million in each category in 1999.
Again, contrast these figures with what were once considered huge numbers – 500,000
                                                
1 The original title of this chapter was to be called “the problem of refugee resettlement.” The term
‘reintegration’ is used instead of ‘resettlement’ to distinguish between refugees who are relocated
(resettled) abroad and refugees settled in first countries of asylum in contrast to those who return to their
homeland. ‘Resettlement’ in ordinary language encompasses the problems faced by all refugees, whether
repatriated, settled in countries of first asylum or relocated and settled in immigration countries like Canada
and the United States. To distinguish the three situations, the problem of repatriated refugees is referred to
as one of reintegration as distinct from resettlement.
2 Thus, I am not concerned with asylum seekers in the developed world or settlement in first countries of
asylum, though these issues will, as shall be seen, directly impact on the pressures for and support of the
repatriation process by other countries.
2refugees produced by the Cambodian conflict. In comparison, the 1992-1994
peacebuilding operation in Mozambique involved the repatriation of 1.6 million refugees.
The numbers are large and increasing in both absolute and percentage terms. It
seems unsurprising then when general statements are made, such as in the Central
American Esquipulas Accords (1987)3 that there would be, “no lasting peace without
initiatives to resolve the problems of refugees, returnees and other displaced persons.”
Many studies have drawn the same conclusion. “The return and reintegration of people
who have been uprooted or affected by violence is an important manifestation of the
process whereby national protection is restored and human security reinforced.”4
Resolving the refugee and displaced persons issue would appear to be a core element in
the terms and successful implementation of a peace agreement.
Centrality or Marginality of Refugee and Displaced Persons Repatriation
However, in spite of the rhetoric of the Esquipulas Accords, the analysis of the
issue concluded that refugee repatriation was a marginal issue. Chuck Call explained the
marginality of the refugee repatriation issue in that case by two factors:
First, many refugees residing legally or illegally in the United States during the war
sought and were able to remain there. Despite highly politicized immigration policies
which denied the vast majority of applicants political asylum during the 1980s, specific
U.S. laws and evolving immigration policies eventually permitted the majority of
Salvadoreans resident in the United States to remain through the peace process. Second,
the majority of the refugees in neighboring states and IDPs within the country were
either repopulated (sic!) or resettled before the end of the conflict. Beginning in the mid-
1990s, for a variety of political, strategic and humanitarian reasons, the government,
FMLN-affiliated non-governmental organizations and international agencies supported
the closing down of camps containing displaced persons and refugees. By 1991 almost
all were closed or nearly empty. Though many of these persons did not return to their
places of origin, they were resettled in places and circumstances which left them fewer
incentives and/or resources to return home after the conflict. In short, most of the
resettlement programs normally seen after the war occurred during the Salvadoran
conflict. (pp. 9-10)
Reading the other case studies overwhelmingly give the impression that the
refugee issue was not central to either the success or failure to implement the peace
agreement. In some cases, the agreement itself was silent on the issue of the repatriation
of refugees. (Cf. Liberia case study, p. 37) In other case studies, the study itself is silent
on whether the agreement even made any provision for refugees. (Sri Lanka) Even in
cases where the agreements and studies both mention repatriation of refugees (e.g. UN
Resolution 814 re Somalia  and Sorpong Peou’s study of Cambodia – p. 10), the case
study provides no analysis of its import, consequences, etc. Where discussion is provided,
it is generally terse and really mentioned as a factual aside rather than perceived as a key
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3to understanding the core of the peace agreement and its effects on implementation
strategies.
Thus, the very first issue that requires some determination is whether the
resolution of the plight of the refugees and displaced persons is a marginal or a central
factor in the implementation of peace agreements.
There are a number of reasons why one would expect refugee and IDP
repatriation to be a key issue in both a peace agreement and its implementation. The very
large and increasing numbers alone would suggest the centrality of the issue. Further,
when refugees are not repatriated and successfully reintegrated, they frequently
metamorphose into refugee warriors, perpetuating the cycle of violence. (Zolberg et al,
1989; Khiddu-Makubuya 1994; UNHCR 1995) This was certainly the case with the
Palestinians.
But there are as many if not more cases that could be cited where the displaced do
not become refugee warriors – the Turks and Greeks in Cyprus, the Ouest Deutsch
repatriated into Germany from Eastern Europe after WWII. Further, the cessation of
violence, the setting up of new structures of government, the provisions for disarmament,
the demobilization of soldiers all seem to be so much more urgent and without which
there could be no repatriation.
Further, refugee repatriation seems to bear little correlation with whether or not
provision is made in the peace agreement. Most repatriation is spontaneous, occurring or
not occurring whether or not provided in an agreement and generally ignoring the
elaborate and careful plans made by international agencies for a safe and orderly return.
Such returns often precede or immediately follow the signing of the peace agreement.
When they precede such agreements, the return is often a response to the fact that it is
more dangerous to remain outside one’s country than return to it. Thus, when repatriation
plans are made, it is rare that they are utilized.
There is another factor that may skew the understanding of whether refugees are
central to a peace agreement and its implementation – the skills, expertise and priorities
of the researchers. Most experts in conflict studies know little of the refugee literature.
Their studies have been of wars and conflicts, of mediation and disarmament – the very
meat of the conflict itself. Refugees appear as by-products, a matter of humanitarian
rather than military or political concern. They are perceived as victims rather than agents
involved in the conflict and its resolution. As genuine refugees, they do no bear arms and
seem to pose little risk to the success or failure of a peace agreement even when provision
is made for their return.
It would appear that the issue of refugee repatriation is a core part of an
agreement when the issue of refugee return is a central part of the conflict itself. When
refugees are merely the by-product of the violence and not a target of it, then the issue of
refugee repatriation may indeed be marginal to the peace agreement and its
implementation. At the same time, when the non-return of refugees is considered part of
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repatriation will unlikely be a central part of any agreement. And even when it, if the
ethnic cleansers win de facto even if they lose de jure, as in Bosnia, then more refugees
are produced wherever repatriation takes place. This is certainly true in Kosovo where the
return of the Muslim Kosovors was preceded by and co-terminus with the majority of
Serbs in Kosovo.
There may be another factor influencing whether refugees are central to a peace
agreement. In the war in Sierre Leone, the 1996 Abidjan Peace Agreement made no
provision for the repatriation of refugees. In contrast, the 1997 Conakry agreement did. A
central difference in the 1997 agreement was the fact that ECOWAS, with power to
enforce the agreement, was a party to the agreement intent not only on covering all the
bases rather than avoiding explosive issues, but had its own interests at stake in resolving
the refugee issue.
Classification of Peace Agreements
I suggest that with respect to peace agreements in relation to the centrality of
refugees, they might be classified according to the following possible simple matrix:
                    REFUGEE ISSUE IN RELATION TO PEACE AGREEMENT
CENTRAL MARGINAL
Peace IN Of interest to Of no central concern
one of parties; Concern with humanitarian
party has power aid to implement repatriation
and will use it
Agreement OUT   Of interest to No concern
one party but no
enforcement power
REFUGEE ISSUE IN RELATION TO IMPLEMENTATION
WHEN ISSUE CENTRAL
Implemented Party with interest has both preponderance of power
and willing to use it
Not Implemented Party with interest lacks either the power or the willingness
to use it
5This perspective sidesteps what has always been considered a central issue in
refugee repatriation – namely that the refugee repatriation had to be voluntary. Instead it
suggests that refugee repatriation will be voluntary except in cases where the party with
the interest and the power and the willingness to use it wants or does not want the
refugees repatriated. In that former case, and in spite of moral indigestion by some
onlookers, refugee repatriation will be induced rather than remain voluntary. In the latter
case, no refugee repatriation of any size will take place.
There is another issue that is rarely considered – refugees that are by-products of
the peace itself. This was the case in both Bosnia and Kosovo where the minority left
after failing in their efforts to use violence to become the dominant majority or where the
minority was identified with the instigator of the violence but that instigator eventually
lost the war. After Saddam Hussein was repulsed from Kuwait. The Kuwait government
kicked out a million Palestinians even though only a minority had openly expressed
approval and support for Hussein’s action. (Richmond 1994, 215) provision made or may
not be made for the protection of the ethnic group who lost the conflict – that is in
conflicts where the production of refugees was a central goal of the conflict itself. But
whether provided for in the agreement or not, the minority will only remain to the extent
the “victors” have the commitment, the force and the willingness to use that force to
prevent further ethnic cleansing. Further, the minority must also both perceive this and be
willing to accept living under the new power. The new power need not necessarily belong
to a party to the core conflict but may be the power of an intervenor as in ECOSOC’s
intervention in West African conflicts or NATO’s involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo.
CONTEXT
Another aspect that needs to be considered in the relationship of refugees to the
implementation of peace agreements is the context. That context has many dimensions.
First, peace is intended between and among various groups. Further, the goal of the peace
is not just the cessation of bloodletting and violence, but economic development, the
protection of human rights, the introduction or development of democratic practices, the
protection of minority rights, all as conditions of long term physical, legal, social and
psychological security. Peace is a regional and not just a national issue ven when dealing
with an intra-state war.
Further, the instability in one state has repercussions on the neighboring states. In
the extreme case, the Congo, there are in fact six wars going on at the same time, each in
relation to a different neighbor or set of adjacent states. Refugees themselves have a
dramatic impact on the stability and economic health of a region. Thus, even when
refugees are not an objective of the conflict itself, they may engender conflict in
neighboring states or use their camps in neighboring states as bases from which to launch
attacks on their former homeland. Part of this will be determined by the location of the
refugee camps. That location is often predetermined by environmental, social, political,
logistical and financial constraints rather than the security of the region and of the
refugees themselves. Further, when the rule of law of law is weak in the neighboring state
6where the refugees have obtained temporary asylum, and the refugees are prevented from
repatriation, the propensity to metamorphose into refugee warriors became much greater.
Even if the refugees do not become refugee warriors, but certainly if they do,
there will be a strong likelihood that many refugees are likely to become involved in
illegal entry, drug trafficking, crime, prostitution and the arms trade. Any involvement of
this type will add to the destabilizing propensities in the region. When there is a
determined interest of one party to prevent refugee repatriation, for the security of the
region, quite aside from the interests of the other party, it is important to make provision
for the repatriation of refugees. This is especially crucial before the refugees acquire a
reputation by associating even marginally with such activities. Thus, even when refugees
are not initially perceived to be a crucial element in a peace agreement, they may indeed
be a central element when long term stability of the region is taken into consideration.
 Beyond the immediate contextual elements, there are larger regional and global
factors at work that make the resolution of the refugee issue necessary when drawing up
and implementing a peace agreement. There are regional economic factors. If refugees
are not repatriated, if ethnic separation becomes the de facto solution when the ethnic
cleansers are the de facto winners, then the regional distrust between and among the
ethnic enclaves will engender heightened distrust and hamper if not sabotage efforts to
get regional trade moving again. Since regional inter-state trade usually constitutes the
major part of economic exchanges between and among states, the failure to repatriate
refugees may deform local trading exchanges and seriously hamper the prospects of
economic recovery from the conflict.
It also clear that the globalization of market system has been a force for putting
local conflicts within a world trading context as can be seen from some of the provisions
of more recent peace agreements. Ironically, and something virtually unnoticed in the
studies of the implementation of peace agreements, temporary stability rather than a real
long term peace may be the real goal. This may be one reason the refugee issue may be
marginalized.
Major western powers have both a low tolerance for receiving masses of refugee
flows as well as a low risk strategy in dealing with the conflicts that produce such flows.
There is an unwillingness to risk the lives of one’s own soldiers even to save large
numbers of lives at risk in the intra-state wars. Therefore, they seek strategies which try
to limit the irritability produced by the threat of a large influx that has not been
preselected for entry, but strategy which minimizes the risk to their own military. That
means the peace agreement usually provides for sufficient repatriation for the refugees
without solving the condition of their original displacement. This was true in El Salvador
and it it true in Bosnia.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT and HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
In addition to the political and geographical context, the relationship between the
refugee issue and the drawing up and implementation of peace agreements must be
7viewed in an historical context. In the aftermath of  what was then called the Great War
(WWI), the official solution to a refugee crisis concentrated on internationally endorsed
population exchanges. After World War II with the setting up of UNHCR and the signing
of the Refugee Convention, the solution to refugee issues legally shifted to one based on
individual status determination and humanitarian actions rooted in Cold War politics. Thi
solution was universalized in 1967, But the nineties have born witness to a third
predominant solution - unsanctioned population exchanges and temporary protection for
masses of refugees - while the rhetoric endorses multi-ethnic societies. As a consequence,
many refugees are left in limbo. The provisions in the peace agreement do not recognize
this reality. They shift focus on one solution (putting enormous resources behind minority
returns in Bosnia) while not facilitating the real one available - relocation. This is
apparent in all the studies of the efforts to return refugees and displaced peoples to
minority areas governed by those who led the ethnic cleansing.
Studying case studies of peace agreements and their implementation in
relationship to the refugee and displaced persons issues should reveal how pervasive this
apparent paradox is. Unfortunately the inherent propensity of the conflict situation itself,
the predispositions and skills of those trained to study the conflict and the urgency of
resolving the violent dimensions as quickly as possible, together have a propensity to
marginalize an issue. From a more detached and longer term perspective, the connection
between the refugee and the peace issue would otherwise be viewed as central.
The Media
I will speculate. In Kosovo, if Milosovic had not greatly accelerated the rate of
ethnic cleansing already underway before NATO started its bombing campaign, there
would have been a good chance that a large and effective protest movement against the
bombing would have developed. It was the pictures of wave after wave of fleeing and
distraught masses crossing the borders, destabilizing the local states and carrying with
them tales of atrocities and horrors that provided the passion and support for the bombing
campaign against a sovereign state and the infrastructure that makes it operate.
media and the politics of refugees.
In the Rwanda genocide of the Tutsi, it was not the genocide that instigated an
international response, but the plight of the Hutu refugees at Goma. Refugees provide a
magnet for the media. The plight of the refugees has a powerful effect on whether
western powers become involved. The media coverage also affects how they become
involved and the reaction to that involvement by their publics. I do not recall any of the
case studies taking up the role of the media, especially in relationship to the refugees, and
the impact on the peace agreement and the possibilities of their implementation.
The legal context may be stress the rights that refugees possess, but the ability to
exercise those rights may depend more on perception than on any abstract rights. And the
media is the vehicle for transmitting most of those perceptions.
HUMAN SECURITY
8This brings us to the issue of how the peace process should be approached,
particularly when addressing the refugee issue. Canadians, and York University in
particular, pioneered in developing what has now become widely known as a “human
security” rather than a rights approach to the refugee issue when dealing with peace
agreements and their implementation. This means shifting the focus from gathering up
the arms, demobilizing the soldiers, agreeing on a governing structure, integrating the
army, etc. to focusing on longer term issues of peace.
Thus, the peace agreement, once refugees are made central, would stress
environment, economic, social, psychological, economic, rights. The long terms goals of
reconstruction would be used to frame the immediate objectives such as employment and
housing. Further, there would also be a shift in the interpretation of national interests for
the intervenors. A moral and ethical dimension of national interests would come to be
recognized. After all, in most of these recent conflicts, national interests narrowly defined
were not the instigators of international involvement.  Rather, in every case, compassion
rather than an abstract consideration and calculus of self-interests instigated the
involvement or made it operative after a great deal of rhetorical and diplomatic effort.
Further, it must also be recognized that the interest in human security leads the
rival groups to use the aid given to try to make political points. They want to become
recognized for providing that human seci\urity. Usually this is treated as stealing the
credits (cf. The case study of Mozambique, p. 49) when it also should be viewed as
acculturating the parties to a different set of priorities and values. For as they take credit
for providing the human security, they also begin to take on the role and self-image as
human security providers.
[Other topicsto be discussed focussed on the problems of repatriation themselves:]
PROCESS
SCALE AND TIME FACTORS
DECISION MAKERS
PROTECTION – humanitarian protection zones vs return
ENVIRONMENT
PROPERTY RIGHTS
RECONSTRUCTION
EMPLOYMENT
DEVELOPMENT – complex needs: sustainable
Housing, health, education, economic, political, social
Skills training, capacity building
       - regional trade
- international coordination
GOVERNANCE – state responsibility and accountability
     - international support
RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE
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This chapter concentrates on a number of paradoxes related to the relationship of
peace agreements and their implementation to the problem of refugees. The most blatant
paradox is the discrepancy between the widespread rhetoric that asserts the centrality of
the refugee issue to the peace process and the case studies which generally find that the
issue is a marginal one compared to most of the others. This is in spite of the fact that the
numbers of refugees and displaced persons both as a total and as a percentage of the
populations affected has been increasing. Further, the production of refugees and
displaced persons has often become an objective of the war itself.
I have tried to explain why this occurs and also tried to find a classification to
indicate and provide a guide where even if the refugee issue appears marginal, it is not
and should not be. Further, I have tried to present a number of factors which argue for the
long term importance and centrality of the refugee issue to peace agreements, which we
ignore at our peril. I have tried to contextualize that importance politically,
geographically, historically and conceptually within the emerging concept of human
security as well as the role of the media in relationship top refugees which often becomes
the catalyst for any humanitarian intervention that takes place. Only then do I consider
the critical factors that ought to be considered when dealing with the implementation of a
process of refugee repatriation.
